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Abstract 
We address the issue of the sources of dominant airlines’ pricing power by separating 
premium due to hub operations from that due to airport dominance.  Presence of airports 
serving as hubs for two carriers enables such identification via difference-in-differences.  
Moving from lower to higher prices, the total pricing premium of hub operators (both 
dominant and non-dominant) increases; while the share of the airport dominance 
premium diminishes relative to that of the hub premium.  Absence of hub premium at the 
lower end of the price distribution (and lack of dominance premium at the higher prices) 
suggests frequent flier programs rather than product differentiation as the likely dominant 
source of hub operator’s pricing power. Dominant airline’s ability to charge higher fares 
due to either its airport market share or access to scarce airport facilities is confirmed. 
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1.  Introduction 
Among the possible sources of market power in the airline industry, airport dominance is 
pointed to as a very important one.  At a basic level, the airport dominance effect refers to 
an airline’s ability to charge higher fares for travel to or from an airport, where it has a 
dominant position, relative to the fares it charges for travel elsewhere within its network.  
Evans and Kessides (1993) concluded that the airport dominance is a far more important 
source of market power than route dominance.  They further suggested that the source of 
the dominant carrier’s market power could be either in supplying a different product, or 
in attracting a different kind of (i.e., price insensitive) traveler as compared to other 
airlines serving the same airport. 
 An airline dominating an airport does offer a different product as compared to 
other carriers serving the same gateway. Specifically, it offers direct flights to many more 
destinations than any other carrier at the airport. The dominant carrier uses its frequent 
flier program to reinforce this difference: customers living around the airport dominated 
by a certain carrier will value this airline’s frequent flier program more highly, since they 
will be able to both earn awards (free trips, upgrades, premium status) faster and redeem 
them for travel to more destinations. 
 Major businesses value locating at cities that house hubs of major airlines 
precisely to have access to the carriers’ networks, presumably knowing they will have to 
pay premium fares to respective dominant airlines.  For example, when Boeing decided 
in late 1990s to move its corporate headquarters from Seattle, the two candidate cities 
were Denver and Chicago, both major airline hubs.  The company completed its move to 
Chicago in September 2001. Bel and Fageda (2008) provide more systemic evidence to 
this effect. 
 Identifying the sources of what is defined in the literature as the airport 
dominance premium is both a difficult and an important task.  As Kahn (1993) points out, 
if the dominant carrier attracts a disproportionate share of price-insensitive customers, the 
welfare impact of the ensuing price discrimination is ambiguous. Further, if customers 
overpay the dominant carrier for access to the network of non-stop flights, this may 
amount to little more than ‘quality-based’ pricing, or distribution of the corresponding 
rent between the customer and the airline rather than the market power of the latter. At 
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the same time, frequent flier programs are also considered sources of market power (they 
may both affect market structure at hub airports – for instance, by discouraging entry – 
and give the dominant airline an advantage over the competition it does face).  Finally, 
we cannot rule out the potential contribution of the ‘old-fashioned’ market power, based 
on the dominant airline’s airport market share. 
The broad aim of this study is to address the issue of the sources of higher fares 
charged by the airlines in dominated airports.  More specifically, we disentangle what 
manifests itself (and is referred to in the literature) as the airport dominance effect into 
the two components: the hub premium and the dominance premium.  We exploit the fact 
that five US airports (Atlanta, Denver, Dallas-Fort Worth, Chicago O’Hare, and Phoenix) 
serve as a hub for two major airlines.  Further, three of these five gateways have a clearly 
defined dominant carrier. The hub premium will then refer to the pricing differential 
commanded by a hub operator over the airlines not using a given airport as their hub.  
The dominance premium (if any) is commanded by the dominant hub operator over the 
airline operating its hub but not enjoying the dominant position. 
If only the dominance premium (as we define it) is observed in the data, this will 
imply that establishing a hub does not by itself give the airline any pricing power.  This 
result would be most consistent with ‘classical’ market power due to the airport 
dominance (and very consistent with Borenstein’s (1989) conclusion that the airport 
dominance does not provide any umbrella for other carriers at the airport).   
If we only observe the hub premium but not the dominance premium, we can say 
that establishing a hub is all an airline needs to be able to charge their customers higher 
fares.  That is, an airline’s market power is defined not by the size of its airport presence, 
but by the presence of a network of non-stop flights (quite possibly reinforced by a 
frequent flier program, attracting a disproportionate share of price insensitive business 
travelers). 
For our analysis, we use a sample of actual itineraries collected quarterly by the 
US Department of Transportation (this dataset is known as DB1B).  From this sample, we 
select non-stop and one-stop roundtrip itineraries that originate, terminate or go through 
one of the five hub airports. We apply a relatively simple difference-in-differences 
identification strategy, focusing on an airport-pair-market (APM) fixed effects model, 
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and applying an instrumental variable technique to control for possible endogeneity in 
market concentration and market share.  We also conduct our analysis focusing on both 
average fares and prices representative of the upper and lower end of the distribution. 
We find rather robust evidence in support of the existence of the hub premium 
both in the middle and on the upper end of the price spectrum. The airport dominance 
premium is detected in regressions using average and lower fares as the dependent 
variable.
3
 Our results effectively suggest that, contrary to Lee and Luengo-Prado (2005) 
and Berry et al. (2006), it is the average traveler who is paying the ‘traditional’ airport 
dominance premium; the price-insensitive business traveler pays equal premiums for 
traveling to/from an airline’s hub, whether the airline has a dominant position at its hub 
airport or not.  In other words, a substantial share of the premium paid by travelers at the 
upper end of the price distribution appears to be driven not by airport dominance, but by 
the nature of the (higher quality) product offered by the airline operating the hub.  
Evidence of the absence of hub premium at the lower end of price spectrum suggests that 
frequent flier programs rather than product differentiation is the source of the airport 
dominance premium. 
Our results imply that both pure airport dominance and the nature of the product 
offered by an airline operating a hub-and-spoke network contribute to higher fares 
charged by dominant carriers.
4
 The former is more pronounced at average fares/yields, 
while the latter dominates at the upper end of the price distribution.  Carriers operating a 
hub at an airport, but not enjoying the dominant position are still able to charge the hub 
premium. Thus, the ‘umbrella’ initially thought to be available only to dominant carriers 
(and, according to recent results, to those carriers’ frequent flier program partners) 
applies to any hub operator able to reinforce its hub position with the customer loyalty 
program. 
Our analysis advances our understanding of the nature of fare premiums charged 
by the airlines dominating major airports.  At the same time, a number of issues remain 
not addressed. While we are able to assert that frequent flier programs do reinforce 
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 Some specifications suggest travelers at the upper end of the price distribution pay (on average) higher 
premiums for traveling with the non-dominant hub operator than with the dominant airline. 
4
 Technically, the degree to which we have been able to disentangle the two effects is directly related to 
plausibility of our identifying assumptions. We will defer more detailed discussion to an appropriate 
section of this paper. 
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airlines’ pricing power, we cannot pin down exact estimates of this role.  We believe that 
to properly address this issue one would need much richer data than what is currently 
publicly available. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides a brief review of 
the relevant literature. Section 3 discusses identification strategy in general terms.  
Section 4 describes the data.  Section 5 discusses results of the data analysis.  Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2.  Relevant Literature 
Borenstein (1989) showed that an airline dominating an airport is able to charge higher 
fares. Airport dominance was not, however, found to provide other carriers serving the 
same gateway an ‘umbrella’ for also charging higher prices. The airport dominance effect 
was attributed to the airlines’ frequent flier programs and a feature of the ticket 
distribution market prevalent at that time.
5
 Further, Borenstein (1991) showed that a 
dominant airline had a disproportionately large market share of hub-originating 
passengers (as opposed to passengers terminating at the same hub).  Evans and Kessides 
(1993) asserted that airport dominance was a more important source of market power 
than route dominance (Borenstein’s 1989 study suggested route market share was also an 
important determinant of observed fare premiums). 
The US regulatory authorities have also paid attention to the airport dominance 
effect. In a 1990 report, the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted that 
airlines’ transition to the hub-and-spoke networks following deregulation resulted in 
important airports being dominated by a single airline. The report further claimed that 
this position allowed the dominant airlines to charge a premium for their flights to/from 
the respective airport. Estimates of dominance premiums were also provided. In their 
1995 book, Morrison and Winston criticized the GAO report for not controlling for many 
relevant factors (their analysis produced smaller hub premiums than those calculated by 
the GAO). 
                                                 
5
 Most of the tickets were then distributed by ‘brick-and-mortar’ travel agents, receiving commission from 
the airlines.  Further, airlines often paid so-called TACOs (travel agent commission overrides), or payments 
to agents booking more than a certain share of itineraries with a single airline.  Airlines discontinued 
commission payments to travel agents in 2001-2002; currently, travel service distributors charge their 
customers fixed per booking fees (see Bilotkach and Pejcinovska (2011) for further discussion). 
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Recently, there has been a revival of interest in the issue of airport dominance.  
Berry et al. (2006), having estimated a structural differentiated product model of the 
airline industry, suggested that airlines’ ability to command airport dominance premium 
was limited to the upper end of the price distribution. Consistent with this finding, Lee 
and Luengo-Prado (2005) showed that the observed hub premiums could be explained by 
the passenger mix (proportion of leisure versus business travelers). Bilotkach (2007) 
demonstrated that the airport dominance effect applied to a number of transatlantic 
routes
6
. Lederman (2008) showed that uniting frequent flier programs was a way non-
dominant airlines could get under the ‘umbrella’ available to the dominant carriers, 
thereby providing evidence of importance of frequent flier programs as a factor behind 
the airport dominance premium.  Ciliberto and Williams (2010) demonstrated that the 
hub premium is higher on the upper end of the price distribution, also suggesting that 
limited access to airport facilities explains part of this premium.
7
 Bilotkach and Lakew 
(2013) offer what they call a “30,000-feet view” at the airport concentration – price 
relationship, analyzing a 17-year panel of airport-level data for all airports in the US. This 
study confirms the role of airport dominance as the key source of market power, not only 
for large hubs, but also for the small airports, which tend to be concentrated as well. 
 
3. Identification 
3.1  Identifying Assumptions 
Identifying assumptions which will enable our estimation strategy are the following.  
First, we suppose that hub premium applies to both carriers operating a hub at a given 
airport.  Second, we assume that the airport dominance component of the fare premium 
only applies to the dominant carrier. We will discuss the plausibility of the first 
assumption in the next paragraph. The second assumption is clearly the less defensible of 
the two: we will see from the data that in all airports in our sample, each hub operator has 
a larger presence than any other airline. Therefore, it is possible that an airport dominance 
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 Evidence on the European side (Lijesen et al., 2001, Marin, 1995, Bachis and Piga, 2007) is inconclusive, 
perhaps due to the fact that researchers had to use either offered or aggregated actual fares in their research. 
7
 All five of the airports included in our study are in Ciliberto and Williams’ paper; however, they do not 
measure hub premiums for the non-dominant hub operators at Atlanta, Denver, and Dallas.  Nor do they 
consider Southwest Airlines as operating a hub at Phoenix. 
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premium applies to both hub operators, and not only to the dominant carrier. We will 
return to this issue when discussing estimation results. 
 Next, let us discuss what is potentially behind the hub effect, and why it is 
reasonable to assume that it applies to both hub operators. Any hub operator provides 
residents of the respective metropolitan area access to a network of non-stop flights, 
unmatched by any other carrier serving the same airport, and the value of this network is 
enhanced by the airlines’ frequent flier programs. At the same time, the dominant carrier 
supposedly offers a more extensive network as compared to that of the non-dominant hub 
operator. Hence, we hypothesize the existence of the airport dominance premium over 
and above the hub premium. Yet, in presence of the frequent flier programs this argument 
is not necessarily valid, since a frequent flier maximizes the payoff from his/her miles 
when collecting them with a single airline. Therefore, in the area around an airport with 
two hub operators the market for frequent fliers will likely be ‘segmented’ by the two 
airlines. 
Shares of frequent fliers loyal to one or the other airline could be proportional to 
the carrier’s respective market share at the airport. However, loyal travelers’ willingness 
to pay for access to an airline’s network (and the right to earn and redeem miles over this 
network) may not necessarily be proportional to the network size, but rather dictated by 
the travelers’ idiosyncratic characteristics, as well as by features of the airlines’ customer 
loyalty program. As an example, a traveler loyal to Delta could be drawn to that airline’s 
frequent flier program because it allows him/her to use their miles for a vacation in 
Jackson Hole, WY (an airport served by Delta, United, and American); whereas a traveler 
loyal to AirTran may tend to vacation in Florida (both Delta and AirTran serve numerous 
destinations in this state), but may be drawn to this carrier by convenient schedules or 
excellent on-time performance on routes he/she typically flies on business throughout the 
year. Our hypothetical AirTran frequent flier may value access to the airline’s network 
and miles less, more, or as much as our hypothetical Delta traveler may value access to 
Delta Air Lines’ network and frequent flier program. 
Also, a carrier with a relatively less extensive network as compared to the 
dominant airline can ‘compensate’ for this deficiency by offering its frequent travelers 
easier ways to earn or redeem miles.  In fact, we do observe this strategy practiced by 
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carriers central to our analysis.  AirTran rewards its frequent travelers on the basis of 
flight segments rather than miles they fly (thereby making their frequent flier program 
more attractive to customers who have to take shorter-haul flights frequently).  Frontier 
Airlines (airline sharing Denver hub with United Airlines) requires only 20,000 miles for 
a free ticket within the lower 48 states, whereas United Airlines’ award tickets start at 
25,000 miles. 
3.2  Identification Strategy 
Two approaches to measuring airport dominance effect (using the term as it has been 
previously defined in the relevant studies) have been employed in the literature.  The first 
approach is to compare an airline’s fares for flights to and from the airport where it has a 
dominant position to fares elsewhere within the airline’s network.  The second approach 
compares the dominant airline’s fares for travel to or from the corresponding airport to 
prices charged by other airlines flying into or from the same airport, but not enjoying the 
dominant position. Neither of the two approaches, however, is able to disentangle the hub 
effect from the dominance effect, as we call them. 
To separate the dominance effect on observed fares (and yields) from the hub 
effect, we examine price setting at airports serving as hubs for two carriers. We can say 
that our exercise combines the two above-discussed approaches to measuring airport 
dominance in the following way. In an airport used by two carriers as a hub, any 
premium charged by the dominant airline for non-stop flights to or from this hub relative 
to fares charged over the remainder of that airline’s network includes both the hub effect 
and the dominance effect, whereas the same difference for the non-dominant hub 
operator only includes the hub effect. Both non-stop fares, however, also include airline-
specific effects. To weed these effects out, we include into our sample the one-stop 
itineraries connecting via the respective hub airports – those itineraries do not include 
either dominance or hub effects, only the airline effects. Formally, we can express the 
corresponding fares in the following way: 
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Here    
   denotes price charged by the dominant hub operator for non-stop flights 
to/from the hub airport;   
   is same for the non-dominant hub operator; and         
       
 is 
the price charged by a hub operator for one-stop flight connecting via the corresponding 
hub airport. Then, the difference-in-differences estimator that will identify the dominance 
effect is: 
   (   
      
       )  (  
     
       ) 
That is, dominance effect is identified using the hub operators’ fares charged by them for 
flights to/from their hubs relative to what they charge elsewhere (i.e., for flights 
connecting via those same hubs). 
To identify the hub effect from the data we will use the fares charged by other 
carriers (those not operating a hub at a given airport) offering services to/from a given 
airport.  Presence in the data of other carriers’ itineraries going via the hubs in question 
(more on this in the data section) allows us to identify a similar non-stop – one-stop price 
differential for those airlines, eventually permitting identification of the hub effect as: 
   (  
     
       )  (      
         
       ) 
We will use the non-dominant hub operator for our identification here. The hub effect is 
identified by comparing fares charged by the hub operator to prices of the other airlines 
flying into the same hub airport.  
Thus, our identification strategy is a simple difference-in-differences. Successful 
implementation of this strategy will require data on fares for travel to/from, as well as 
through the hub airports selected for the analysis.  Note that this strategy is similar to that 
applied by Bilotkach (2007) to analyze price setting (including obtaining estimates of the 
airport dominance effect) on several transatlantic airline markets. 
 
4.  Data and Methodology 
4.1  Airports – background 
To enable separation of the hub premium from that due to the airport dominance, we 
selected five airports, each of which serves as a hub for two airlines.  These are Atlanta 
Hartsfield International (airport code ATL); Chicago O’Hare (ORD); Dallas-Ft. Worth 
International (DFW); Denver International (DEN); and Phoenix Sky Harbor (PHX) 
airports. Of the five airports, three are clearly dominated by one of the two hub operators.  
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Specifically, ATL, being the world’s busiest airport in terms of passenger volume, is the 
largest hub for both Delta Air Lines and low cost carrier AirTran,
8
 and is dominated by 
the former airline. American Airlines has a clear dominant position at DFW, while Delta 
also used this airport as one of its hubs until February 2005. United is the dominant 
carrier at DEN, though the airport is also used by Frontier Airlines as its only hub.   
Chicago O’Hare and Phoenix Sky Harbor are not dominated by any single hub 
operator. ORD is a hub for both American and United. US Airways
9
 and Southwest 
Airlines channel their passenger traffic via PHX. Additionally, ATL, DEN, and PHX are 
the only major commercial airports in respective metropolitan areas. Besides ORD, 
Chicago metropolitan area is served by Midway (MDW) airport, used by Southwest 
Airlines as its ‘quasi-hub’. While Dallas-Ft.Worth metropolitan area is also served by 
Dallas Love Field airport (DAL), also used by Southwest Airlines; Wright Amendment 
has at the time period covered by our data restricted Southwest Airlines’ ability to fly 
non-stop from this gateway.
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Note that in two of the three airports dominated by a single carrier the dominant 
airline shares the gateway with a so-called low cost carrier (Frontier and AirTran). The 
conventional wisdom suggests that low-cost carriers do not operate hub-and-spoke 
networks in the same way as traditional legacy carriers do. However, on the US market 
Southwest Airlines is the only such carrier, still channeling over half of its traffic via its 
‘quasi-hubs’ (PHX being one of them). AirTran and Frontier, on the other hand, operate 
clearly defined single-hub networks, with the former to a degree specializing in vacation 
traffic to Florida destinations, and Frontier running a rather typical ‘coast-to-coast and in-
between’ hub-and-spoke network. 
According to the US Department of Transportation, in 2007 the five airports we 
selected for our study handled over 270 million passengers in the US market (and another 
40-plus million international travelers). To put these numbers in perspective, note that US 
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 In 2011, AirTran was bought by Southwest Airlines. 
9
 Historically, America West Airlines was the carrier that established its hub at PHX; in 2005 America 
West acquired US Airways and kept that airline’s name after the acquisition. 
10
 Original law (called Amendment to the International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979) 
allowed Southwest Airlines to fly non-stop from DAL only within Texas and the neighboring states.  The 
law was repealed in October 2006. However, Southwest will not gain unlimited rights to non-stop services 
out of DAL until 2014. 
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airlines carried about 660 million passengers
11
 in the domestic market in 2007. In that 
same year, the five airports included in our study handled about 1.7 million of the 10.3 
million commercial passenger flights performed within the United States. Thus, one in 
six flights within the US that year took off from (or landed at) one of the five above listed 
airports. The disparity between the apparent passenger shares (it appears from the above 
numbers that 45 percent of all US passengers fly to/from/via the five gateways we 
selected) and flights most probably stems from the likely double-counting of connecting 
passengers at hub airports (once as arriving, and once more as departing, while on the 
same trip) in reported airport-level traffic statistics. 
Table 1 lists the number of destinations served by each airport’s two leading 
carriers (including regional airlines using the carriers’ brands) in July of every year from 
1999 to 2005 (the time period that our data spans). From that table we clearly observe 
that in ATL, DEN, and DFW a dominant carrier offers a much broader network as 
compared to the other hub operator at the same airport. Note also how fast Delta Air 
Lines dismantled its hub at DFW.
12
  It is also interesting that AirTran and Frontier 
managed to grow their networks substantially, in spite of competing with such 
heavyweights as Delta and United on their home turf (or rather, home tarmac).  In ORD 
and PHX we observe relative parity between the two biggest carriers, in terms of the 
number of destinations served. At Chicago O’Hare, both American and United added 
endpoints over the years. While the number of airports served by America West from 
Phoenix Sky Harbor did not change, Southwest added new destinations quite 
aggressively (though not nearly as aggressively as Frontier did at Denver). 
4.2  Methodology 
We will use two average price measures as dependent variable: natural logarithm of fare, 
as well as natural logarithm of yield (fare per mile). Fare is, as discussed above, the 
passenger-weighted average price aggregated at the airline-routing-quarter level. In 
addition to the passenger-weighted average price, we calculated standard deviation of the 
same. To be in line with previous studies considering airport dominance effect at the 
upper tail of the price distribution, we use the natural logarithm of average plus standard 
                                                 
11
 This is number of enplanements reported by the US Department of Transportation. 
12
 Delta closed its hub at DFW in February 2005. 
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deviation fare (as well as of the corresponding yield) in some specifications. Using this 
measure to get an idea of how prices behave at the upper tail of the distribution might be 
unorthodox,
13
 and it cuts off observations for airlines observed offering a single fare on a 
given airport-pair market.
14
 But then, small players are also likely to introduce noise into 
our data, as we observe their behavior in a non-systematic way. 
 Our estimation technique of choice is the airport-pair-market fixed-effects. We 
estimate both the regular fixed effects and the instrumental variable specifications. We 
had to find instruments for the measures of market concentration (Herfindhal-
Hirschmann Index) and market power (airline’s market share on the route). Consistent 
with the previous literature, one-year lagged HHI was used as an instrument for the 
former. Evans and Kessides (1993) note that finding an appropriate instrument for market 
share is a difficult task. We decided to instrument the airline’s route market share with 
the average of the airline’s market shares across the routes originating at the respective 
airport, excluding the current route. This measure is generally in the spirit of using 
variables from other markets the firm operates in to instrument for the same measure on 
the current market. It also potentially suffers from the possibility of being correlated with 
the error term in case of a shock affecting an airline’s flights to all destinations from a 
given airport.
15
 Using the firm’s intra-route rank of the market share as the instrument, as 
done by Evans and Kessides (1993), is complicated in our case by the fact that we 
calculate market shares for one-stop trips separately from those for non-stop flights.  
Markets end up being quite competitive at the one-stop level,
16
 meaning that demand and 
other unobservable price shocks can lead to change in ranks of the firms’ market shares – 
according to Evans and Kessides, in such a case intra-route rank will no longer be a valid 
instrument for the market share. In our data, our instrument of choice turned out 
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 Upper percentiles (such as upper quartile, 80
th
 or 90
th
 percentile) of observed price distributions have 
been typically used in the literature.  If we believe that distribution of fares is close to log-normal; our 
measure corresponds to approximately 85
th
 percentile (based on one-sigma rule for normal distributions). 
14
 For these observations, standard deviation cannot be obtained. 
15
 Such as an unusually aggressive advertising campaign at the city of origin – just as using a variable from 
another market as an instrument can make it correlated with the error term if a firm undertakes a nation-
wide advertising campaign. 
16
 While mean HHI for one-stop itineraries (0.48) is not that lower than for non-stop ones (0.57); there is an 
appreciable mass of routes that are competitive at the one-stop level.  More specifically, lower quartile of 
HHI at one-stop level is close in value (0.31) to the lower decile for HHI at the non-stop level. 
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reasonably well correlated with the variable it instruments for – with correlation 
coefficient of 0.51. 
In all specifications, we make a distinction between the following indicators of 
airlines’ hub and dominant positions (these will be our key variables): 
 Hub operator’s non-stop itinerary indicator – takes value of 1 for direct flights by an 
airline operating a hub at the airport (i.e., Delta at ATL and DFW, American at DFW 
and ORD, United at ORD and DEN, America West and Southwest at PHX, Air Tran 
at ATL, and Frontier at DEN). We will denote the corresponding coefficient via      
 Dominant airline’s non-stop itinerary – takes value of 1 for direct flights by an airline 
dominating the airport (Delta at ATL, United at DEN, and American at DFW). The 
notation for the corresponding coefficient is     
         
 Non-dominant hub operator’s non-stop itinerary – takes value of 1 for direct flights 
by an airline operating a hub at the airport, but dominated by another carrier (Delta at 
DFW, Frontier at DEN, and Air Tran at ATL). The notation is     
             
 Other airline’s non-stop itinerary to/from either of the five hub airports in our dataset, 
denoted via        
We can write the specification to be estimated as: 
                                   
             
          
    
                 
                                     
Where      is the measure of price (airfare or yield) charged by airline i on market j in 
quarter t. Further,    represent market fixed effects;    denote time effects;    are airline 
effects;      is the vector of control variables, as discussed above; and      is the error 
term. Corresponding indicator variables are denoted via     . 
The dominance effect is identified by the difference between the coefficients for 
dominant and non-dominant hub operator’s non-stop itineraries. The hub effect is 
identified via the difference between the sum of      and     
             and       . 
Formally, the estimate of the dominance effect is obtained from the regression results as: 
 ̂   ̂   
          ̂   
             
Whereas the estimate of the hub effect, assuming  ̂  is positive, is obtained as: 
 ̂   ̂     ̂   
              ̂      
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More generally, we can write the above expression as: 
 ̂   ̂       { ̂   
          ̂   
            }   ̂      
4.3  Sample and Variables 
Our main data source is the US Department of Transportation Origin and Destination 
Survey, databank DB1B. The DB1B is a 10 percent sample of actual itineraries, collected 
by the US Department of Transportation. In this databank, the itineraries are grouped at 
the fare-airline-service-class-routing level (e.g., $400 for trip from Los Angeles to 
Denver to Boston and back to Los Angeles via Denver on United Airlines). The number 
of passengers found to pay a certain fare flying a certain airline on a certain route is also 
reported. The data is collected quarterly and is made available for download from the 
Department’s web site free of charge.17  We use DB1B for all quarters from 1999 through 
2005. 
Each entry in the DB1B includes fare paid (net of taxes and fees), class of 
service,
18
 and detailed information on routing, including identity of airlines selling the 
ticket and operating each flight, distance traveled, and all intermediate airports visited.  
The destination of the trip is coded through the directional break in itinerary. 
Our sample consists of trips that originate, terminate, or connect through Denver, 
Atlanta, Dallas-Ft. Worth, Phoenix, or Chicago O’Hare airports. We apply the following 
filters to arrive at the final sample of itineraries that will be used for analysis. 
 Each segment in the itinerary had to be served by the same airline, with regional 
carriers re-coded as corresponding major airlines. We therefore excluded interline 
itineraries. 
 To ensure consistency across all years and quarters, we only include restricted 
economy class itineraries for all airlines except Southwest Airlines (which reports all 
its itineraries as restricted first class). Lee and Luengo-Prado (2005) used data from 
the third quarter of 2000 and separated restricted economy class itineraries from 
unrestricted economy class and first class itineraries as a way to capture passenger 
mix on the markets. We, however, found that the carriers are rather inconsistent in 
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 This relates to the dataset for the US market. The International DB1B remains a restricted dataset – 
permission from the Department of Transportation is required to obtain access to this data. 
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 Technically, services are classified as first unrestricted, first restricted, business unrestricted, business 
restricted, economy unrestricted, economy restricted.   
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separating the unrestricted economy itineraries from the restricted ones across the 
quarters in our sample. At the same time, the restricted economy
19
 classification is 
used most frequently (over 85 percent of the time), and restricted economy fares 
appear to span the expected range of economy class fares rather well. 
 We converted all fares into real dollars (with 2000 as the base year), using seasonally 
adjusted GDP price index, reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
 In line with previous studies (e.g., Lee and Luengo-Prado, 2005), itineraries with 
yield less than 2 cents per mile in year 2000 prices (i.e., about $100 for a coast-to-
coast roundtrip ticket) were dropped. 
 We only selected non-stop or one-stop roundtrip flights without open jaws (i.e., return 
trips to the same airports) and with a single directional break (i.e., no multi-city trips). 
 One-stop roundtrip itineraries had to connect through the same airport in both 
directions. 
 To avoid contaminating our data with small markets (for which obtaining a 
representative picture will be difficult), we only chose those markets where 100 or 
more passengers were observed in our sample in a given quarter. This means, roughly 
speaking, that we only look at markets with annual passenger traffic of over 4000 
passengers, or about eleven passengers per day. It should be noted that looking only 
at sufficiently large market is a typical practice in the airline industry studies.  
We then constructed our dependent variable as the passenger-weighted mean fare at the 
airline-routing-quarter level (we will use natural logarithm of this in our regressions).  
This means, for instance, that American Airlines’ fares between the same airports via 
different hubs (Chicago and Dallas-Ft. Worth) are viewed separately. Also, should an 
airline offer both non-stop and one-stop products on the same market (e.g., Delta might, 
in addition to offering non-stop Los Angeles–Atlanta flights, channel some of the traffic 
between the two cities via Dallas), average fares for such non-stop and one-stop services 
were computed separately. We also computed passenger-weighted standard deviations at 
the airline-routing-quarter level. Finally, the passenger-weighted mean yields (fare per 
mile) were computed. 
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 We found no information on whether there are any formal criteria to differentiate between restricted and 
unrestricted fares: while non-refundable ticket requiring 21-day advance purchase is clearly ‘restricted’, we 
are not sure, for instance, how a refundable ticket requiring 3-day advance purchase would be coded. 
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Having applied the above restrictions, we ended up with over 600,000 
observations, spanning over 5,400 unique directional airport-pair markets.  We are thus 
looking at approximately 2,700 relatively large airport-pair markets in the country
20
 – a 
typical restriction the literature is to consider up to top 1000 city-pair or airport-pair 
routes. Since all the passengers at the airline-routing-quarter level are collapsed into a 
single observation corresponding to the average fare, most of our observations 
correspond to one-stop products.
21
 We should also note that not all of the one-stop 
observations correspond to the airlines channeling passengers via their own hubs. For 
example, in addition to the hub operators United and Frontier; American, Alaska, Delta, 
Northwest, and US Airways are also found to channel their passengers via Denver. Same 
holds true for other hub airports we focus on. 
 Before we continue with discussion of control variables, it pays to clarify our 
definition of airlines. In the US market, some of the commercial passenger services 
(particularly on thinner markets) are performed by so-called regional carriers, effectively 
operating as agents of major airlines. These carriers’ business model relies on operating 
smaller aircraft on shorter-haul routes, exploiting cost savings due to less diverse fleet 
and outsourced marketing. Interestingly enough, Jordan (2008) showed that, by looking 
at exit rates in the US airline industry since deregulation, regional airlines’ model appears 
the most successful one – fewer regional carriers exited, both in absolute and relative 
terms, as compared to both legacy, new full-service, and discount airlines. Those regional 
carriers can be either independent companies (SkyWest, Atlantic Southeast); or fully 
owned subsidiaries of major carriers (American Eagle); some of them (ExpressJet) 
market services under their brands in addition to acting as major carriers’ agents.  
Moreover, several of those regional carriers perform services for more than one major 
airline (e.g., SkyWest flies as a Delta, United, and Midwest agent).  We decided to assign 
regional carriers’ services to respective major airlines (since pricing decisions are made at 
the major airline level). More detailed information about this assignment can be found in 
the Appendix. 
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 Due to the geographical location of the airports included into our study, some of the largest markets (e.g., 
Los Angeles to San Francisco) were most probably not included into our dataset. 
21
 An airline operating a hub-and-spoke network with n spoke airports will offer n non-stop products and up 
to 0.5n(n+1) one-stop products.  
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We will use respective indicator variables to control for year-specific, quarter-
specific, year-quarter-specific, and airline-specific heterogeneities.
22
 We should also note 
that, since our specifications will effectively include indicator variables for all non-stop 
services, airline indicator variables will measure the effects of through-hub services. 
 Distance and an indicator for non-stop flights are the two itinerary-specific 
controls we use.  In the airport-pair market fixed effects model, we expect the coefficient 
on distance to have a negative sign, as it measures the effect of a more circuitous (and 
therefore less desirable) route on the fares between two airports.  Non-stop flights, 
however, should be more expensive than one-stops, other things equal. 
 For the measure of market concentration, we will use the regular Herfindhal-
Hirschmann Index (HHI). Market share is used as the measure of the airline’s market 
power. The measures were calculated from DB1B passenger numbers. As far as market 
boundaries are concerned, for each origin-destination airport-pair we consider non-stop 
services separately from one-stop flights. As an example, for the Los Angeles-Atlanta 
airport-pair market we calculated HHI and market shares for non-stop and one-stop 
services separately. 
 Finally, market-specific control we use is the geometric average of endpoints’ 
population, at the Metropolitan Statistical Area level.  We used Census data for the year 
2000, as well as population and per capita income estimates for 2006, interpolating for 
other years in our sample.  The list of the variables is in the Appendix. The basic 
descriptive statistics are in Table 2. 
 
5.  Data Analysis 
5.1  Results and Discussion 
Tables 3 and 4 report our estimation results. Table 3 shows results for both average and 
high fare, reporting the output for both price and yield as dependent variables. Table 4 
presents the estimation results for the lower end of the pricing distribution. The 
dependent variable in these specifications is the natural logarithm of weighted average 
yield minus one third of the standard deviation of the same. 
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 We have repeated our analysis excluding last two quarters of 2001 and first two quarters of 2002 to 
control for the shock associated with events of September 11, 2001.  Results were similar to those reported 
here. 
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We have also conducted our estimation exercise on sub-samples of itineraries 
going via either of the five hub airports. These results – available from the authors upon 
request – largely confirm our findings reported in Tables 3 and 4. 
The main conclusion that follows from Tables 3 and 4 is that airport dominance 
effect is more pronounced in average and low fares than at the upper end of the price 
distribution, whereas hub effect is clearly present at the high end of price distribution. 
There is also some evidence that hub carrier’s pricing power extends to the middle of the 
fare distribution. However, pricing premium present in the low fares is due to airport 
dominance rather than hub operations. Another interesting and unexpected result from the 
high end of the price distribution is that both fares and yields of the non-dominant hub 
operators are higher than same for the dominant airlines – hence the negative estimate of 
the dominance effect reported for instrumental variable specifications in Table 3. 
To appreciate the magnitude of the effects and put our results into clearer 
perspective, consider the following example. We will focus on specifications with the 
natural logarithm of yield as the dependent variable, and considering results for two-stage 
least squares regressions. From Table 3 it is evident that for the average yield hub 
operators enjoy about 8.3 percent premium above other carriers flying from/into the same 
hub (the difference between the estimates on Hub Operator*Direct and Other 
Carriers*Direct interaction variables). With the mean yield for non-stop trips in our 
sample at 25.5 cents per mile (same number for the entire sample is 14.9 cents per 
mile
23
), our estimate suggests that an airline operating a hub charges on average 2.1 cents 
per mile more than an airline flying to/from the same airport and not operating a hub 
there. To put this in perspective, consider a route between Atlanta and Denver – two of 
the hubs included into our analysis.  With the roundtrip distance for the non-stop journey 
between the two airports at 2400 miles, the average total premium implied by our above 
estimate is $50.40 in year 2000 prices, or $60.14 in year 2007 prices.  Note also that the 
mean roundtrip price for a non-stop itinerary in our sample is $349.41 in year 2000 
dollars. 
                                                 
23 According to the US Department of Transportation, the average nominal yield for the entire US market 
in 2000 was 14.57 cents per mile. 
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The estimate of the dominance effect for average yield in the instrumental 
variable specification suggests that the non-dominant hub operators’ average yields are 
about 5.5 percent lower than their dominant counterparts. Given the sample average yield 
for non-stop itineraries reported above, our estimate of the airport dominance effect is 
equivalent to about 1.40 cents per mile.  The corresponding estimate of the hub effect 
implies that the non-dominant hub operator’s yields for non-stop flights out the hub 
airport are 6.2 percent (1.58 cents per mile) higher than same for an airline not operating 
a hub but flying to/from a given airport. Thus, of the total of about 3 cents per mile 
average yield premium the dominant carrier is estimated to charge in our sample, about 
53 percent is due to the hub operation of this airline, and 47 percent – due to airport 
dominance. 
Coming back to our Atlanta-Denver example; our estimates suggest that due to 
the airport dominance effect, the dominant hub operators (Delta and United) will charge 
on average $33.60 in year 2000 prices more than the non-dominant hub operators 
(AirTran and Frontier) on the same route.  The estimate of the hub effect tells us that all 
four airlines, due to operating hubs at one or the other endpoint, are able to charge $37.94 
more than would a hypothetical carrier wishing to operate on this route outside of its 
general hub-and-spoke network.  Note also that all these estimates are over and above the 
airline specific effects. 
At the upper tail of the price distribution, however, the non-dominant hub 
operators enjoy about 6.3 percent premium over dominant airlines.
24
  This amounts to 2.7 
cents per mile, given that the average ‘high yield’ for non-stop roundtrip itineraries in our 
sample is 43 cents per mile. This translates into $64.80 price differential for our Atlanta – 
Denver non-stop roundtrip (the average ‘high price’ – weighted average fare plus 
standard deviation – for the non-stop roundtrip itineraries in our sample is about $602).  
While a hub operator on average enjoys a higher premium at the upper end of the yield 
distribution than in the middle (eighteen percent, or 7.74 cents per mile), there is strictly 
speaking no dominance effect to speak about.  The magnitude of the hub premium at the 
upper end of yield distribution is then 21.8 percent, or 9.4 cents per mile.  Thus, at the 
                                                 
24  An alternative interpretation – higher market power of the non-dominant hub operators – is not 
very plausible, since non-dominant operators’ market shares are much lower than those of the dominant 
airlines. 
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upper end of the yield distribution, most (if not all) of the pricing premium of the hub 
operator can be attributed to the operation of the hub, and not the carrier’s dominant 
position at the airport. 
Note also that the airport-pair market fixed effects regressions not controlling for 
potential endogeneity paint a somewhat different picture. At the average yields, there is 
no hub premium. The hub operator’s ‘averaged’ premium for its non-stop flights to/from 
the hub is still about 8 percent, the dominance premium is estimated at 15 percent, while 
there is no hub premium. At the upper end of the yield distribution, simple fixed effects 
regression suggests the airport dominance premium of almost 11.2 percent, and the hub 
premium of about 15.6 percent.  
Notwithstanding the discrepancy between the fixed effects and the instrumental 
variable estimation results, there is clear evidence that the estimated airport dominance 
premium is smaller relative to the hub premium at the upper end of the price distribution 
than at the average fares. We should also note that of the two estimation approaches we 
tend to put more faith into the instrumental variable specifications – market concentration 
and market shares are clearly endogenously determined in the price regressions, implying 
that fixed effects least squares estimates will be both biased and inconsistent. 
 In general, we found that airlines enjoying the dominant position at an airport are 
able to extract the airport dominance premium from an average and more price conscious 
travelers. Premium charged to the higher paying customers appears to be related more to 
the fact that the airline operating a hub offers its customers a different product, perhaps 
the main differentiating characteristic of which is the access to a network of destinations 
other carriers do not offer, rather than to the carrier’s market share at the hub airport. 
 The only real surprise in coefficients on the control variables is lower fares for 
direct flights in some specifications.  The possible explanation of this result is that the 
direct flights in our sample are shorter than the one-stop itineraries, and the logarithm of 
distance alone does not cope with this well.  Note that this counterintuitive relationship is 
far less common in the regressions where yield is used as a dependent variable. 
 One may find it strange that our results appear to suggest that firms on more 
concentrated markets charge lower fares. However, one has to note that our specifications 
include both market share and HHI, and that we examine price-setting at the individual 
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airline rather than the market level.  Holding the market share fixed, higher HHI simply 
means that competitors an airline faces in the market have become stronger. Expected 
effect of this change on fares charged by an individual carrier is actually uncertain. On 
one hand, more concentration can lead to all airlines involved raising their fares due to 
higher market power. On the other hand, stronger competitors may mean fiercer 
competition and lower fares to keep market share intact. The latter effect appears to 
dominate. Note also that higher market share holding HHI constant leads to higher fares, 
as expected. For instance, our results indicate that, other things equal, a monopoly 
airline’s average yield will be 3.7 percent higher than same for an airline operating on a 
symmetric duopoly market.
25
 For an airline holding 50 percent market share, a merger 
between the two competitors each holding 25 percent market share will imply – assuming 
the carrier still has 50 percent market share after the merger – a 4.5 percent decrease in 
average yield (HHI changes from 0.375 to 0.5 as a result of such a merger). The merged 
airline, however, will be able to command a 6.4 percent higher average yield as compared 
to what the carriers would have charged before the merger. 
5.2 Interpretation 
Let us discuss what our results tell us about the possible sources of pricing premiums 
charged by the airlines operating hubs at the airport. Our main result is that this premium 
applies to either airline operating a hub, whether it dominates the airport or not. Another 
result that appears robust is that the composition of the pricing premium is different at the 
upper end of the pricing distribution, with the airport dominance premium playing a 
lesser role than at the average fares/yields. 
 The proposed explanations of the dominant airline’s pricing power at the 
respective airports included airport market share, product differentiation, airlines’ loyalty 
programs, and control of scarce airport resources. While we are unable to directly 
comment on the latter, we can say that our results show two things.  First, there appears 
to be something different in the product that the hub operators offer as compared to other 
airlines. Second, the firm’s market share at the airport does play a role.  At the same time, 
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 The calculation behind this is (0.437-0.363)*(1-0.5), where 0.437 is the regression coefficient for HHI,  
-0.363 is same for the market share, and 1 and 0.5 are both HHI and market share for monopoly and 
symmetric duopoly, respectively. The relevant regression from Table 3 is the IV specification for average 
yield. 
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the diminishing share of the airport dominance premium as we move up the fare 
distribution suggests product differentiation appears a more important determinant than 
the airport market share for the price insensitive consumers. 
 But, where are the frequent flier programs in this? The airlines do use their loyalty 
programs to reinforce product differentiation and extract some premium from their 
customers. Lederman (2008) exploited the airlines’ frequent flier program partnerships to 
show that partner airlines without the dominant position at the airport are able to charge 
the fare premium just like the dominant carrier – that is, carriers offering a different 
product are able to charge premium prices despite lack of dominance. Our finding that 
the airport dominance premium becomes smaller, while hub premium grows more 
important at the upper end of the distribution is evidence that frequent flier programs play 
some role as the determinant of the hub operators’ price premium. Indeed, at the upper 
end of the price distribution we are more likely to encounter tickets purchased by 
frequent business travelers, who appear to be paying premium for the product 
differentiation aspect of hub operations (potentially reinforced by loyalty programs) 
rather than the dominant carrier’s market share. 
 Presence of the hub effect in the middle of the price distribution is subject to a 
number of interpretations. On one hand, we can suggest this is the evidence favoring the 
product differentiation story behind the hub premium.  At the same time, we cannot rule 
out that the non-dominant hub operator’s fares and yields could also include the market 
share based effect (non-dominant hub operators boast larger airport market shares than 
other carriers). Additionally, loyalty programs could also affect the non-dominant 
operator’s fares in the middle of the price distribution. 
 At the lower fares, however, we can expect relatively little effect of the loyalty 
programs, assuming those tickets are predominantly purchased by the leisure travelers 
who simply go for the best price. Therefore, any hub effect observed at the lower fares is 
likely due to product differentiation rather than loyalty programs. Recall that our 
estimation results demonstrate no hub premium at the lower end of the price distribution, 
consistently with this expectation, so that leisure travelers are paying premium prices 
based on the higher market share of the dominant carrier. 
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 Given the above considerations, we can conclude that the dominant airline’s 
market share at the airport allows it to charge a premium pretty much across the entire 
price spectrum. At the same time, the airline operating a hub at the same airport but 
holding a smaller market share is able to charge the corresponding premium to the price 
insensitive customers. Further, as the hub premium is more visible at higher prices (and 
dominance premium disappears on that end of price/yield distribution), this suggests that 
the source of this premium for the non-dominant hub operator is predominantly in its 
frequent flier program rather than access to a network of destinations served with non-
stop flights. We however admit that this statement is subject to a number of caveats, most 
importantly the assumption that prices observed at the high-end of the distribution 
represent trips by business travelers that are loyal to a particular airline. 
These findings suggest the following implications. First, the sources of the pricing 
premium by the hub operator are frequent flier programs and airport market share – 
product differentiation might also play a role, but our evidence does not point to this 
consistently. Further, importance of the airport market share relative to frequent flier 
programs diminishes as we move to the higher fares.  Higher magnitude of the total 
pricing premium on the upper tail of the distribution is consistent with previously 
reported findings that the dominant airline’s pricing power applies more to the price 
insensitive than to average travelers. At the same time, we can claim that the dominant 
airline is able to charge premium prices to the business travelers thanks at least in part to 
the frequent flier program it operates. Most importantly, we demonstrate that any airline 
establishing a hub at an airport will be able, through its customer loyalty program (and 
presumably a product differentiation component), to attract some loyal price insensitive 
passengers and charge premium prices to them. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
Airlines’ ability to charge higher fares for flights to/from airports where they enjoy a 
dominant position has been a rather established fact More recent studies (Lee and 
Luengo-Prado, 2005; Berry et al., 2006) suggested that the observed airport dominance 
premium appears to apply to price-insensitive business travelers. 
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 The goal of our study is to approach the issue of sources of dominant airlines’ 
pricing power by separating the “hub effect” from the “dominance effect”.  We note that 
every large airport which is dominated by a single carrier also serves as a hub in the 
respective carrier’s network.  The “hub effect” may exist due to the fact that the airline 
operating a hub at an airport will offer its customers access to a larger network of non-
stop flights, possibly reinforced by the hub operator’s frequent flier program.  Thus, we 
define “hub effect” as premium charged by a hub operator; and “dominance effect” is 
then price premium charged by the dominant airline above that due to its hub operation.  
Estimation of the two effects requires examining pricing at airports that serve as hubs for 
more than one carrier. 
 We use a sample of actual itineraries collected quarterly by the US Department of 
Transportation (this dataset is known as DB1B).  For our analysis, we select non-stop and 
one-stop roundtrip itineraries that originate, terminate or go through one of the five 
airports which serve (or served) as a hub for two carriers: Atlanta, Chicago O’Hare, 
Dallas-Ft. Worth, Phoenix, and Denver.  Data analysis shows that as we go from the 
lower to the higher prices, the total pricing premium increases, while the relative 
importance of the airport dominance component of this premium diminishes relative to 
the hub premium component. Further, while the source of the airport dominance premium 
appears to be the airline’s dominance in terms of the airport market share (we cannot, 
however, exclude the possibility of the dominant airline’s control of airport facilities as 
an explanation), the hub premium appears to be driven by the hub operators’ frequent 
flier programs rather than by the potential product differentiation by itself. 
 We have effectively found additional evidence for the airlines’ loyalty programs 
as a factor beyond the pricing premium charged by the dominant airlines at their hubs.  
Yet, we clearly show that any hub operator, and not only the dominant airline, is capable 
of creating the pricing ‘umbrella’ at the airport where it has established significant 
presence.  We also demonstrate that airport dominance remains an important determinant 
of the respective airline’s market power, due to either the carrier’s airport market share, 
or access to the airport’s facilities. 
 One will be right to question the applicability of our results outside of our sample.  
Especially interesting is the question of our study’s implications for airports which are 
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dominated by a single hub operator. Since identification of components of apparent fare 
premium will be impossible for such airports, we can only speculate on the distribution of 
the fare premium into the “hub effect” and “dominance effect” for those airports.  We 
can, however, state that what this premium reflects is not only airlines exercising their 
market power, but also consumers’ willingness to pay for the extensive network of non-
stop flights not available from other cities, reinforced by the frequent flier programs 
which enable customers to accumulate miles faster, other things equal. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1 Description of Variables 
Dependent Variables 
Natural logarithm of 
passenger weighted fare 
Weighted at the airline-routing level for each quarter.  All fares are in year 
2000 dollars 
Natural logarithm of ‘high’ 
fare 
Weighted fare plus the corresponding passenger weighted standard 
deviation, at the airline-routing level. 
Natural logarithm of 
passenger weighted yield 
Passenger weighted fare divided by the total roundtrip distance 
Natural logarithm of ‘high’ 
yield 
Passenger weighted fare plus the passenger weighted standard deviation, 
divided by the total roundtrip distance 
Hub/ Airport Dominance Indicator Variables 
Hub Operator*Direct Indicator variable for direct itineraries by an airline operating hub at an 
airport included into our analysis to/from the respective airport. 
Dominant*Direct Indicator variable for direct itineraries flown by a dominant airline to/from 
the airport at which it has dominant position (DL at ATL; UA at DEN; AA 
at DFW) 
Non-dominant*Direct Indicator variable for direct itineraries flown by a hub operator without the 
dominant position at the airport, to/from the respective airport (DL at 
DFW; F9 at DEN; FL at ATL) 
Other Carriers*Direct Indicator variable for direct itineraries flown by an airline not operating a 
hub at a given airport 
(Carrier 1)*Direct;  
(Carrier 2)*Direct 
Indicator variables for direct itineraries by hub operators in airports 
without the dominant airline (AA and UA at ORD; WN and HP at PHX).  
Used in regressions on respective sub-samples 
Control Variables 
Distance Total roundtrip distance, in miles 
Direct Flights Indicator variable for non-stop roundtrip itineraries 
Market Share Airline’s market share, computed separately for non-stop and one-stop 
itineraries 
HHI Herfindhal-Hirschmann Index, computed separately for non-stop and one-
stop itineraries 
Population average Geometrical average of endpoints’ MSA population 
Instruments 
Lagged HHI One-year lagged Herfindhal-Hirschmann index, instrument for HHI 
Mean market share on other 
routes 
Instrument for market share.  Computed as the average market share for 
airline’s services out of a given airport (separately for non-stop and one-
stop itineraries), excluding the current service. 
 
In addition to the variables listed above; we have included year, quarter, year-quarter, and 
airline indicator variables into all regressions reported in the paper. 
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Table A.2 Assignment of Regional Carriers 
Major Carrier Regional Carrier 
American Airlines (AA) 
American Eagle* 
Executive Airlines* 
Regions Air 
Chautauqua Airlines 
Trans States 
Alaska Airlines (AS) Horizon Air* 
Continental Airlines (CO) 
ExpressJet 
Commutair 
Colgan 
Skywest 
Delta Air Lines (DL) 
ASA/ Atlantic Southeast Airlines* 
Comair* 
Skywest 
Chautauqua Airlines
a 
Republic 
Freedom
b 
Northwest Airlines (NW) 
Mesaba Airlines 
Express Airlines 
United Airlines (UA) 
Air Wisconsin
c 
GoJet 
Shuttle America 
Trans States 
Skywest
d
 
Mesa 
Chautauqua Airlines 
Colgan
e
 
US Airways (US)
f
 
Air Wisconsin 
Chautauqua Airlines 
Mesa 
Regional carriers that serve multiple majors are assigned based on hub identities. 
Notes: 
a 
Only routes involving cities in Florida and Raleigh-Durham (RDU) 
b 
Only routes involving Orlando, FL (MCO) 
c 
Only on routes involving Chicago O'hare (ORD) and Washington Dulles (IAD) 
d 
Including routes involving Portland, OR (PDX), Medford, OR (MFR), and Eureka-Arcata, CA (ACV) 
e 
Only routes involving Washington Dulles (IAD) 
f 
The following airlines, which are observed in the database, are also assigned to US Airways: PSA 
Airlines, Piedmont, and America West  
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Table 1 Domestic Destinations Served by Main Airlines 
 Atlanta Denver Dallas Chicago Phoenix 
 Delta 
Air 
Tran 
United Frontier AA Delta AA United 
America 
West 
South
west 
July 1999 124 30 86 17 120 58 91 88 53 32 
July 2000 134 29 80 20 120 63 96 96 54 37 
July 2001 138 32 83 29 118 65 93 103 56 38 
July 2002 138 36 80 29 119 60 96 84 55 43 
July 2003 137 38 81 30 116 66 82 91 58 41 
July 2004 137 42 75 36 126 72 109 116 56 42 
July 2005 154 45 75 39 135 63 110 119 56 45 
Notes: 
1. Numbers obtained from analysis of dataset T100 Segment for the US market 
2. Includes destinations served by regional carriers operating under the major airline’s name 
3. In July of 2005, US Airways was technically the second-largest airline in terms of destinations served 
from DFW, with flights to seven airports. 
4. America West merged with US Airways in September of 2005; transition to the “new” US Airways 
with PHX as one of the hubs was completed over the next two years. 
5. No other carrier serves more than thirteen unique airports from any of the above gateways in July of 
any given year. 
 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for Main Variables 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Median 
Price (Year 2000 dollars) 395.37 224.32 334.33 
High Price (mean plus standard deviation) 542.10 259.51 453.31 
Low Price (mean minus 1/3 standard 
deviation) 
342.73 225.21 269.70 
Yield, year 2000 dollars per mile 0.1488 0.1365 0.1094 
High Yield 0.2069 0.1734 0.1605 
Low Yield 0.1309 0.1353 0.0921 
HHI 0.4845 0.2268 0.4380 
Market Share 0.2661 0.2896 0.1454 
Distance, miles roundtrip 3,263.5 1,472.0 3,106.0 
Average Population 2,739,395 2,938,662 1,820,924 
Note: construction of the sample is discussed in Section 4 of this paper 
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Table 3 Main Estimation Results 
Variable 
Price Yield 
Average High Average High 
FE IV FE IV FE IV FE IV 
Log(Distance)5 
-0.146 
(0.003) 
-0.051 
(0.006) 
-0.039 
(0.003) 
0.116 
(0.005) 
-0.0004 
(1.2E-06) 
-0.0003 
(2.0E-06) 
-0.0003 
(1.0E-06) 
-0.0003 
(1.7E-06) 
Direct Flights 
0.021 
(0.004) 
-0.074 
(0.006) 
0.240 
(0.003) 
0.079 
(0.005) 
0.086 
(0.004) 
-0.013 
(0.006) 
0.294 
(0.003) 
0.126 
(0.005) 
HHI 
0.051 
(0.005) 
-0.363 
(0.040) 
0.048 
(0.004) 
-0.391 
(0.033) 
0.043 
(0.005) 
-0.363 
(0.040) 
0.041 
(0.004) 
-0.394 
(0.034) 
Market Share 
0.141 
(0.003) 
0.441 
(0.014) 
0.185 
(0.002) 
0.711 
(0.012) 
0.141 
(0.003) 
0.437 
(0.014) 
0.185 
(0.002) 
0.714 
(0.012) 
Population  Average 
5.99E-09 
(5.2E-10) 
6.14E-09 
(5.3E-10) 
5.78E-09 
(4.1E-10) 
6.13E-09 
(4.3E-10) 
5.84E-09 
(5.3E-10) 
5.99E-09 
(5.3E-10) 
5.79E-09 
(4.1E-10) 
6.12E-09 
(4.4E-10) 
Hub 
Operator*Direct (A) 
0.092 
(0.002) 
0.111 
(0.002) 
0.069 
(0.002) 
0.095 
(0.002) 
0.101 
(0.002) 
0.120 
(0.002) 
0.078 
(0.002) 
0.102 
(0.002) 
Dominant 
Airline*Direct (B) 
0.031 
(0.006) 
-0.005* 
(0.006) 
0.062 
(0.005) 
0.007* 
(0.005) 
0.072 
(0.006) 
0.033 
(0.006) 
0.098 
(0.005) 
0.038 
(0.005) 
Non-
dominant*Direct 
(C) 
-0.141 
(0.008) 
-0.078 
(0.009) 
-0.071 
(0.006) 
0.051 
(0.007) 
-0.078 
(0.008) 
-0.021 
(0.009) 
-0.014 
(0.006) 
0.101 
(0.007) 
Other 
Carriers*Direct (D) 
0.022 
(0.006) 
0.039 
(0.006) 
-0.093 
(0.004) 
-0.079 
(0.004) 
0.020 
(0.006) 
0.037 
(0.006) 
-0.092 
(0.005) 
-0.078 
(0.005) 
       
0.172 
(0.014) 
0.073 
(0.015) 
0.133 
(0.011) 
-0.044 
(0.012) 
0.150 
(0.014) 
0.054 
(0.015) 
0.112 
(0.011) 
-0.063 
(0.012) 
      
           
-0.071 
(0.016) 
-0.006* 
(0.018) 
0.091 
(0.012) 
0.067 
(0.013) 
0.003* 
(0.016) 
0.062 
(0.017) 
0.156 
(0.015) 
0.218 
(0.012) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.448 0.462 0.482 0.411 0.614 0.604 0.712 0.673 
Number of 
Observations 
634,895 538,501 634,895 538,501 
Notes: 
1. Dependent variable is natural logarithm of price or yield.  Average price/yield corresponds to 
passenger-weighted mean, as discussed in text; high price/yield is passenger-weighted mean plus 
standard deviation, as discussed in text. 
2. FE stands for airport-pair market fixed effects model; IV is fixed effects model with instrumental 
variables. 
3. All specifications include other control variables as indicated in the text, which are not reported. 
4. Star indicates lack of statistical significance at 5 percent level. 
5. Distance was used instead of log(distance) as independent variable in specifications with yield as the 
dependent variable. 
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Table 4 Results for the Lower End of the Price Distribution 
  
Variable Fixed Effects Instrumental Variable 
Distance 
-0.0003 
(1.0E-06) 
-0.0003 
(1.7E-06) 
Direct Flights 
0.0408 
(0.0059) 
0.0610 
(0.0052) 
HHI 
0.0884 
(0.0051) 
-0.2480 
(0.0717) 
Market Share 
0.1165 
(0.0077) 
0.0653 
(0.0064) 
Population  Average 
3.46E-09 
(6.06E-10) 
6.01E-09 
(5.61E-10) 
Hub Operator*Direct 
0.0857 
(0.0023) 
0.0923 
(0.0029) 
Dominant Airline*Direct 
0.0833 
(0.0046) 
0.0796 
(0.0047) 
Non-dominant*Direct 
-0.0589 
(0.0046) 
-0.0814 
(0.0069) 
Other Carriers*Direct 
0.0380 
(0.0048) 
0.0418 
(0.0051) 
       
0.1422 
(0.0092) 
0.1610 
(0.0116) 
                
-0.0112* 
(0.0161) 
-0.0309 
(0.149) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.7979 0.7927 
Number of Observations 538501 
Notes: 
1. Dependent variable is natural logarithm of passenger-weighted mean minus one third of standard 
deviation of the same.  
2. All specifications include other control variables as indicated in the text, which are not reported. 
3. Star indicates lack of statistical significance at 5 percent level. 
 
